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ABSTRACT
Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the se-
curity of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smart-
phones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code.
Preventing unauthorised information flow is a core duty
of the operating system, however, present OSes are unable
to prevent timing channels. We argue that OSes must pro-
vide time protection in addition to the established memory
protection. We examine the requirements of time protec-
tion, present a design and its implementation in the seL4
microkernel, and evaluate its efficacy as well as performance
overhead on Arm and x86 processors.
1 INTRODUCTION
One of the oldest problems in operating systems (OS) re-
search is how to confine programs so they do not leak infor-
mation [Lampson 1973]. To achieve confinement, the operat-
ing system needs to control all of the means of communica-
tion that the program can use. For that purpose, programs are
typically grouped into security domains, with the operating
system exerting its control on cross-domain communication.
Programs, however, can bypass OS protection by sending
information over channels that are not intended for com-
munication. Historically, such covert channels were explored
within the context of militarymulti-level-secure systems [De-
partment of Defence 1986]. Cloud computing, smartphone
apps and server-provided JavaScript executed in browsers
mean that we now routinely share computing platforms with
untrusted, potentially malicious, third-party code.
OSes have traditionally enforced security throughmemory
protection, i.e. spatial isolation of security domains. Recent ad-
vances include formal proof of spatial security enforcement
by the seL4 microkernel [Klein et al. 2014], including proof
of the absence of covert storage channels [Murray et al. 2013],
i.e. channels based on storing information that can be later
loaded [Department of Defence 1986; Schaefer et al. 1977].
Spatial isolation can thus be considered a solved problem.
The same cannot be said about temporal isolation. Timing
channels, and in particular microarchitectural channels [Ge
et al. 2018b], which exploit timing variations due to shared
use of the hardware, remain a fundamental OS security chal-
lenge that has eluded a comprehensive solution to date. Its
importance is highlighted by recent attacks, including the
extraction of encryption keys across cores [Irazoqui et al.
2015; Liu et al. 2015] through side channels, i.e. without the
cooperation of the key owner.
In contrast, covert channels depend on insider help and are
traditionally considered a less significant threat. However, in
the recent Spectre attack [Kocher et al. 2019], an adversary
uses a covert communication channel from speculatively
executed gadgets to leak information. This demonstrates
that covert channels pose a real security risk even where
no side-channel attack is known. Furthermore, covert chan-
nel mechanisms bear the risk of being exploitable as a side
channel by an ingenious attacker.
We argue that it is time to take temporal isolation seri-
ously, and make time protection a primary OS duty, just as the
established memory protection.1 Such a design must elim-
inate, as far as possible, the sharing of hardware resources
that is the underlying cause of timing channels. The ultimate
aim should be to obtain temporal isolation guarantees com-
parable to the spatial isolation proofs of seL4, but for now we
focus on a design that is suitable for a verifiable OS kernel,
i.e. minimal, general and policy-free.
Specifically, we make the following contributions:
• We define the requirements for providing time protec-
tion, enabling confinement in the presence of microar-
chitectural timing channels (Section 3.2);
• we introduce a policy-free kernel clone operation that
allows almost perfect partitioning of a system, i.e. al-
most completely removing sharing between security
domains (Section 3.3);
• we present an implementation in seL4 (Section 4);
• we show that our implementation of time protection
is effective, transparently removing timing channels,
within limitations of present hardware (Section 5.3);
1Note that we use the term “OS” in a generic sense, referring to the most
privileged software level that is responsible for security enforcement. This
could refer to a hypervisor or the OS of a non-virtualised system.
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• we show that the overhead imposed by these mecha-
nisms is low (Section 5.4).
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Covert channels and side channels
A covert channel is an information flow that uses a mecha-
nism not intended for information transfer [Lampson 1973].
Covert channels therefore may violate the system’s security
policy, allowing communication between security domains
that should be isolated. Note that our use of the term (se-
curity) domain is more general than the standard OS term
protection domain (a specific set of access rights). A security
domain consists of one or more protection domains.
There is a traditional distinction between storage and tim-
ing channels, where exploitation of the latter requires the
communicating domains to have a common notion of time
[Department of Defence 1986; Schaefer et al. 1977; Wray
1991]. In principle, it is possible to completely eliminate stor-
age channels, as was done in the information-flow proof of
seL4 [Murray et al. 2013]. 2
Despite recent progress on proving upper bounds for the
cache side channels of cryptographic implementations [Doy-
chev et al. 2013; Köpf et al. 2012], proofs of complete elimi-
nation of timing channels in a non-trivial system are beyond
current formal approaches, and measurements are essential
for their analysis.
In a narrow sense, a covert channel requires collusion be-
tween the domains, one acting as a sender and the other as
a receiver. Typical cases of senders are Trojans, i.e. trusted
code that operates maliciously, or untrusted code that is be-
ing confined [Lampson 1973]. Due to the collusion, a covert
channel represents a worst case for bandwidth of a channel.
In contrast, a side channel has an unwitting sender, called
the victim, who, through its normal operation, is leaking
information to an attacker acting as the receiver. An im-
portant example is a victim executing in a virtual machine
(VM) on a public cloud, who is being attacked by a malicious
co-resident VM [İnci et al. 2016; Yarom and Falkner 2014].
2.2 Microarchitectural channels
Microarchitectural timing channels result from competition
for capacity- or bandwidth-limited hardware features that
are functionally transparent to software [Ge et al. 2018b].
Capacity-limited resources include the data and instruc-
tion caches, these can be used to establish high-bandwidth
channels [Hu 1992; Liu et al. 2015; Maurice et al. 2017]. How-
ever, other microarchitectural state, such as the translation
lookasid buffer (TLB), branch predictor (BP) or prefetcher
2Specifically, the proof shows that no machine state that is touched by
the kernel can be used as a storage channel, it does not exclude channels
through state of which the kernel is unaware.
state machines, can be used as well. Fundamentally, the cache
channel works by the sender (intentionally or incidentally)
modulating its footprint in the cache through its execution,
and the receiver probing this footprint by systematically
touching cache lines and measuring memory latency by ob-
serving its own execution speed. Low latency means that a
line is still in the cache from an earlier access, while high
latency means that the corresponding line has been replaced
by the sender competing for cache space. Such attacks are
possible where the resource is shared concurrently (cores
or hardware threads sharing a cache) or time-multiplexed
(time-sharing a core).
Side-channel attacks are similar, except that the sender
does not actively cooperate, but accesses cache lines accord-
ing to its computational needs. Thus, the attacker must syn-
chronise its attack with the victim’s execution and eliminate
any noise with more advanced techniques. Side-channel at-
tacks have been demonstrated against the L1-D [Hu 1992]
and L1-I caches [Acıiçmez 2007], the last-level cache (LLC)
[Irazoqui et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2015], the TLB [Gras et al.
2018; Hund et al. 2013] and the BP [Acıiçmez et al. 2007].
Interconnects of limited bandwidth can also be used for
covert channels: the sender encodes information into its
bandwidth consumption, and the receiver senses the avail-
able bandwidth. So far, interconnects can only be exploited
as a covert channel while the sender and receiver execute
concurrently (on different cores). Also, if only bandwidth can
be used for signalling, side channels are probably impossible
to implement, none have been demonstrated to date.
2.3 Countermeasures
The countermeasures must prevent interference resulting
from resource competition while processing secret informa-
tion. For bandwidth-limited interconnects, this would require
time-multiplexing the interconnect or using some hardware
mechanism to partition available bandwidth.3
The OS can prevent interference on stateful resources by
flushing between accesses or by partitioning.4
Flushing is conceptually simple (although can be diffi-
cult in practice, as we will discuss in Section 4.3). It is only
applicable for time-multiplexed hardware; flushing cannot
prevent cross-core attacks through a shared cache. Flushing
can also be very costly in the case of large caches (LLC), as
we demonstrate in Section 5.2.
3Intel recently introduced memory bandwidth allocation (MBA) technology,
which imposes approximate limits on the memory bandwidth available to a
core [Intel Corporation 2016]. This is a step towards bandwidth partitioning,
but the approximate enforcement is not sufficient for preventing covert
channels.
4In principle, it is also possible to prevent timing channels by denying
attackers access to real time, but in practice this is infeasible except in
extremely constrained scenarios.
2
Partitioning by the OS is only possible where the OS has
control over how domains access the shared infrastructure.
This is the case in physically-indexed caches (generally the
L2 · · · LLC), as the OS controls the allocation of physical
memory frames to domains, and thus the physical addresses.
The standard technique is page colouring, which makes use of
the fact that in large set-associative caches, the set-selector
bits in the address overlap with the page number. A particular
page can therefore only ever be resident in a specific part
of the cache, referred to as the “colour” of the page. With
a page size of P , a cache of size S and associativity w has
S/wP colours. Therefore, the OS can partition the physically-
indexed cache with coloured frames. By building domains
with disjoint colours, the OS can prevent them competing
for the same cache lines [Kessler and Hill 1992; Liedtke et al.
1997; Lynch et al. 1992].
On most hardware the OS cannot colour the small L1
caches, because they only have a single colour, but also be-
cause they are generally indexed by virtual address, which is
not under OS control. The same applies to the other on-core
state, such as the TLB and BP. Hence, if domains share a core,
these on-core caches must be flushed on a domain switch.
Some architectures provide hardware mechanisms for par-
titioning caches. For example, many Arm processors support
pinning whole sets of the L1 I- and D-caches [ARM Ltd. 2008].
Prior work has used this feature to provide a small amount
of safe, on-chip memory for storing encryption keys [Colp
et al. 2015]. Similarly, Intel recently introduced a feature
called cache allocation technology (CAT), which supports
way-based partitioning of the LLC, and which also can be
used to provide secure memory [Liu et al. 2016].
Although such secure memory areas can be used to protect
against side channels, we believe the time protection, like
memory protection, should be a mandatory (black-box) OS
security enforcement mechanism, rather than depending on
application cooperation. Only mandatory enforcement can
support confinement.
2.4 seL4
seL4 is a microkernel designed for use in security- and safety-
critical systems. It features formal, machine-checked proofs
that the implementation (at the level of the executable binary)
is functionally correct against a formal model, and that the
formal model enforces integrity and confidentiality (ignoring
timing channels) [Klein et al. 2014].
Like many other security-oriented systems [Bomberger
et al. 1992; Shapiro et al. 1999], seL4 uses capabilities [Den-
nis and Van Horn 1966] for access control: access to any
object must be authorised by an appropriate capability. seL4
takes a somewhat extreme view of policy-mechanism sep-
aration [Levin et al. 1975], by delegating all memory man-
agement to user level. After booting up, the kernel never
allocates memory; it has no heap and uses a strictly bounded
stack. Any memory that is free after the kernel boots is
handed to the initial usermode process, dubbed the root task,
as “Untyped” (meaning unused) memory.
Memory needed by the kernel for object metadata, includ-
ing page tables, thread control blocks (TCBs) and capability
storage, must be provided to the kernel by the usermode
process which creates the need for such data. For example,
if a process wants to create a new thread, it not only has
to provide memory for that thread’s stack, but it also must
hand to the kernel memory for storing the TCB. This is done
by “re-typing” some Untyped memory into the TCB ker-
nel object type. While userland now holds a capability to a
kernel object, it cannot access its data directly. Instead, the
capability is the authentication token for performing system
calls on the object (e.g. manipulating a thread’s scheduling
parameters) or destroying the object (and thereby recovering
the original Untyped memory).
This model of memory management aids isolation. For
example, the root task might do nothing but partition free
memory into two pools, initiate a process in each pool, giving
it complete control over its pool but no access to anything
else, and then commit suicide. This system will then remain
strictly (and provably) partitioned for the rest of its life, with
no (overt) means of communication between the partitions.
Furthermore, as kernel metadata is stored in memory pro-
vided to the kernel by userland, it is as partitioned as userland
3 ATTACKS AND DEFENCES
3.1 Threat scenarios
We aim to develop general time-protection mechanisms suit-
able for a wide range of use cases. To represent these, we
pick threat scenarios from opposite ends of the spectrum
(summarised in Figure 1). If we can satisfy both, we should
be able to address many other cases as well.
3.1.1 Confinement. In this scenario, untrusted (malicious)
code attempts to exfiltrate sensitive data which it processes.
This could represent untrusted code (such as a unverified
library, third-party app or web browser plugin) which has
access to sensitive personal data, or the gadget in a Spectre
attack. An underlying assumption in these examples is that
the code cannot be trusted not to leak information, hence
the OS’s time protection must prevent leakage through a
microarchitectural channel.
In this scenario we assume that the system either runs on
a single core (at least while the sensitive code is executing),
or co-schedules domains across the cores such that at any
3
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Figure 1: Threat scenarios: The arrow from Dom0 to
Dom1 represents the confinement scenario of leakage
through the intra-core covert channel, while the ar-
row from Dom0 to Dom2 indicates the cloud scenario
of a cross-core side channel through a shared cache.
time only one domain executes. We require this restriction
to prevent the use of the memory bus as a high-bandwidth
channel [Hu 1991; Wu et al. 2012], addressing which is out-
side the scope of this work and likely impossible with current
hardware (Intel MBA notwithstanding).
3.1.2 Cloud. A public cloud hosts VMs belonging to
mutually-distrusting clients executing concurrently on the
same processor. As the VMs are able to communicate with
the outside world, covert channels are impossible to prevent,
so the interconnect channel is of not of much relevance. In-
stead we aim to prevent side channels, where an attacking
VM is trying to infer secrets held by a victim VM. Recent
work demonstrated the feasibility of cross-core and cross-
processor side channel attacks through the LLC [İnci et al.
2016; Irazoqui et al. 2015, 2016; Liu et al. 2015]. No side-
channel attacks on the memory bus are known to date [Ge
et al. 2018b] and they are probably infeasible.5
Multiple attacks exploiting concurrent execution within
a core have been demonstrated [Acıiçmez and Seifert 2007;
Percival 2005; Yarom et al. 2016] and hypervisor providers ad-
vise against sharing cores between VMs [Zhang et al. 2012].
The high level of resource sharing between hyperthreads
prevents spatial partitioning. We therefore assume that hy-
perthreading is either disabled or that all hyperthreads of a
core belong to the same VM. We do allow time-multiplexing
a core between domains.
Characteristic of the cloud scenario is that it is very per-
formance sensitive. The business model of the cloud is fun-
damentally based on maximising resource utilisation, which
rules out restrictions such as not sharing processors between
VMs. This also means that solutions that lead to significant
overall performance degradation are not acceptable.
5A recently published bus side-channel attack [Wang and Suh 2012] was
only demonstrated in a simulator. More importantly, it relies on the cache
being small, making it inapplicable to modern processors.
3.2 Requirements for time protection
To address the threats above, we propose a combination of
techniques for spatially partitioning concurrently shared re-
sources, and for flushing time-multiplexed resources during
domain switches. As discussed in Section 2.3, flushing the
virtually indexed on-core state (L1, TLB, BP) is unavoidable
where a core is time-multiplexed between domains.
Requirement 1: Flush on-core state
When time-sharing a core, the OS must flush on-core
microarchitectural state on partition switch.
Other core-private caches, such as the (physically ad-
dressed) L2 in Intel processors, could be flushed or parti-
tioned. Hardware resources shared between cores, in par-
ticular the LLC, must be partitioned by the OS, as flushing
introduces too much overhead (see Section 5.2) and cannot
prevent timing channels in our cloud scenario.
Colouring rules out sharing of physical frames between
partitions, whether explicitly or transparently via page dedu-
plication, and thus may increase the aggregate memory
footprint of the system. However, this is unavoidable, as
even (read-only) sharing of code has been shown to produce
exploitable side channels [Gullasch et al. 2011; Yarom and
Falkner 2014]. We are not aware of any public cloud provider
that supports cross-VM deduplication and some hypervi-
sor providers explicitly discourage the practice [VMware
Knowledge Base 2014] due to the risks it presents.
This leaves the kernel itself. Similar to shared libraries, the
kernel’s code and data can also be used as a timing channel,
we will demonstrate this in Section 5.3.1.
Requirement 2: Partition the kernel
Each domain must have its private copy of kernel text,
stack and (as much as possible) global data.
As discussed in Section 2.4, partitioning most kernel data
is straightforward in seL4: partitioning all user memory au-
tomatically partitions all dynamically allocated (i.e. user-
provided) kernel memory as well. Hence, colouring user
memory will colour all dynamically allocated kernel data
structures. Significantly more work would be required to
implement such partitioning in other systems, but there is
no fundamental reason why it could not be done. This leaves
a (in seL4 small) amount of global kernel data uncoloured.
Requirement 3: Deterministic data sharing
Access to remaining shared kernel data must be deter-
ministic enough to prevent its use for timing channels.
The latency of flushing on-core caches can also be used
as a channel, as we will show in Section 5.3.4. The reason is
that flushing the L1-D cache forces a write-back of all dirty
lines, which means that the latency depends on the amount
of dirty data, and thus on the execution history:
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Requirement 4: Flush deterministically
The kernel must pad cache flushing to its worst-case
latency.
Interrupts could also be used for a covert channel (al-
though the bandwidth would be low, as this could not signal
more than a few bits per partition switch). They are irrelevant
to the cloud scenario, as there is no evidence that interrupts
could be used as side channels.
Requirement 5: Partition interrupts
When sharing a core, the kernel must disable or parti-
tion any interrupts other than the preemption timer.
Strategies for satisfying most of these requirements are
well understood. We will now describe an approach that
satisfies Requirement 2, Requirement 5 and simplifies Re-
quirement 3 as a side effect. Remember from Section 1 that
we are looking for mechanisms that are simple and policy
free, to make them suitable for a verifiable kernel.
3.3 Partitioning the OS: Cloning the kernel
Requirement 2 demands per-partition copies of the ker-
nel. It would certainly be possible to structure a system at
boot-image configuration time, such that each partition is
given a separate kernel text segment, as in some NUMA
systems [Concurrent Real Time 2012]. The partitions would
still share global kernel data, which then requires careful
handling as per Requirement 3. The latter can be simplified
by reducing the amount of shared global kernel data to a
minimum, and replicate as much of it as possible between
kernel instances, resulting in something resembling a multi-
kernel [Baumann et al. 2009] on a single core, although more
extreme in that kernel text is also separate.
The drawback of this approach is that it would lead to a
completely static partitioning, where the configuration of
partitions, and thus the system’s security policy, is baked
into the kernel boot image. As changes of policy would re-
quire changes to the kernel itself, this reduces the degree
of assurance (or increases its cost). Especially in the case of
seL4, the initialisation code would have to be re-verified for
each configuration, or assurance lost.
We therefore favour an approach where the kernel is ig-
norant of the specific security policy, only one kernel con-
figuration (which should eventually be completely verified)
is ever used, and the security policy is defined by the initial
user process, just as with the present seL4 kernel.
We introduce a policy-free kernel clone mechanism. Its
high-level description is creating a copy of a kernel image
in user-supplied memory, including a stack and replicas of
almost all global kernel data. The initial user process can use
kernel clone to set up an almost perfectly partitioned system.
Specifically, the initial process separates all free memory
into coloured pools, one per partition, clones a kernel for
each partition into memory from the partition’s pool, starts
a child process in each pool, and associates the child with
the corresponding kernel image, and then commits suicide,
resulting in a completely and permanently coloured system.
The existing mechanisms of seL4 are sufficient to guaran-
tee that such a system will remain coloured for its lifetime.
Furthermore, the process can be repeated: a partition can
further sub-divide itself with new kernel clones, as long as
it has sufficient Untyped memory and more than one page
colour left. Partitioning can also be reverted (assuming that
the process that created it remains runnable).
4 IMPLEMENTATION IN SEL4
4.1 Kernel clone overview
In seL4, all access is controlled by capabilities. To control
cloning, we introduce a new object type, Kernel_Image,
which represents a kernel. A holder of a clone capability
to a Kernel_Image object, with access to sufficient Untyped
memory, can clone the kernel. A Kernel_Image can be de-
stroyed like any other object, and revoking a Kernel_Image
capability destroys all kernels cloned from it.
We introduce a second new object type, Kernel_Memory,
which represents physical memory that can be mapped to a
kernel image. This is analogous to the existing Frame type,
which represents memory that can be mapped into a user
address space.
At boot time, the kernel creates a Kernel_Image master
capability, which represents the present (and only) kernel and
includes the clone right. It hands this capability, together
with the size of the image, to the initial user thread. That
thread can then partition the system by first partitioning its
Untyped memory by colour. For each partition it clones a
new kernel from the initial one, using some of the partition’s
memory, sets up an initial address space and thread in each of
them, associates the threads with the respective kernels, and
makes them runnable. The initial thread can prevent other
threads from cloning kernels by handing them only derived
Kernel_Image capabilities with the clone right stripped.
Cloning consists of three steps. (1) The user thread retypes
some Untyped into an (uninitialised) Kernel_Image and Ker-
nel_Memory of sufficient size, (2) it allocates an address
space identifier (ASID) to the uninitialised Kernel_Image, (3)
it invokes Kernel_Clone on the Kernel_Image, passing a
Kernel_Imagewith clone right and Kernel_Memory capabil-
ities as parameters, resulting in an initialised Kernel_Image.
Cloning copies the source kernel’s code, read-only data
(incl. interrupt vector table etc.) and stack. It also creates a
new idle thread and a new kernel address space; the seL4
kernel has an address space that contains the kernel objects
resulting from retype operations. This means that the Ker-
nel_Image is represented as the root of the kernel’s address
5
space, plus an ASID. Hence, any cloned Kernel_Image can
independently handle any system calls, receive interrupts
(Section 4.2) and system timer ticks, and run an idle thread
when no user thread is runnable on a core.
The new kernel shares only the following static data with
the source kernel:
• the scheduler’s array of head pointers to per-priority
ready queues, as well as the bitmap used to find the
highest-priority thread in constant time
• the current scheduling decision
• the IRQ state table and capabilities for IRQ endpoints
(i.e. references to interrupt handlers)
• the interrupt currently being handled (if any)
• the first-level hardware ASID table
• the IO port control table (x86)
• the pointers for the current thread, its capability store
(Cspace), the current kernel, idle thread, and the thread
currently owning the floating point unit (FPU)
• the kernel lock (for SMP)
• the barrier used for inter processor interrupts (SMP).
We perform an audit of the shared data to ensure it cannot
be used as a cross-core side channel.
We add to each TCB the Kernel_Image capability of the
kernel that handles that thread’s system calls. The creator
of a TCB can use the TCB_Config system call associate the
thread with a specific Kernel_Image .
4.2 Partitioning interrupts
To support Requirement 5 we assign interrupt sources to a
Kernel_Image. Interrupts (other than the kernel’s preemp-
tion timer) are controlled by IRQ_Handler capabilities; the
Kernel_SetInt system call allows associating an IRQ with
a kernel. At any time, only the preemption timer and in-
terrupts associated with the current Kernel_Image can be
unmasked, thus preventing kernels from triggering inter-
rupts across partition boundaries, as long as all interrupts
are partitioned. Note that policy-freedom implies that the
system will not enforce IRQ partitioning.
4.3 Domain-switch actions
The running kernel is mostly unaware of partitioning. As
the kernel is mapped at a fixed address in the virtual address
space, the kernel (code and static data) switch happens im-
plicitly when switching the page-directory pointer, the only
explicit action needed for completing the kernel switch is
switching the stack (after copying the present stack to the
new one). The kernel detects the need for a stack switch by
comparing the Kernel_Image reference in the destination
thread’s TCB with itself. In a properly partitioned system,
the stack switch only happens on a preemption-timer inter-
rupt. In addition, the stack switch also implies actions for
satisfying Requirements 1, 3, 4 and 5.
We flush all on-core microarchitectural state (Require-
ment 1) after switching stacks. The multicore version of
seL4 presently uses a big lock for performance and verifiabil-
ity [Peters et al. 2015]; we release the lock before flushing.
To reset on-core state on Arm, we flush the L1 caches
(DCCISW and ICIALLU), TLBs (TLBIALL), and BP (BPIALL).
On x86 we flush the TLBs (invpcid) and use the recently
added indirect branch control (IBC) feature [Intel 2018b] for
flushing the BP. Flushing the L1-D and -I caches presents a
challenge on x86. While it has an instruction for flushing the
complete cache hierarchy, wbinvd, it has no instruction for
selectively flushing the L1 caches. We therefore have to im-
plement a “manual” flush: The kernel sequentially traverses
a buffer the size of the L1-D cache, performing a load opera-
tion on one word per cache line. Similarly, the kernel flushes
the L1-I cache by following a sequence of jumps through a
cache-sized buffer, which also indirectly flushes the branch
target buffer (BTB).6
For addressing Requirement 4, an authorised thread (e.g.
the cloner) may configure a switching latency. The kernel
defers returning to user mode until the configured time is
elapsed since the preemption interrupt.
Satisfying Requirement 3 is much simplified by cloning,
as the kernels share almost no data (Section 4.1). We achieve
determinism by carefully prefetching all shared data before
returning to userland, by touching each cache line. This is
done just prior to the padding of the domain-switch latency.
As the kernel image and stack are already switched, and
the kernel exit code path is deterministic, this prevents the
latency of the exit code from depending on the previous
domain’s execution (via lower-level caches).
To satisfy Requirement 5, we mask all interrupts before
switching the kernel stack, and after switching unmask the
ones associated with the new kernel. On x86, interrupts
are controlled by a hierarchical interrupt routing structure,
all the bottom-layer interrupts are eventually routed to the
interrupt controllers on CPU cores. Because the kernel exe-
cutes with interrupts disabled, there exists a race condition,
where an interrupt is still accepted by the CPU just after the
bottom-level IRQ source has been masked off. The kernel re-
solves this by probing any possible pending interrupts after
masking, acknowledging them at the hardware level. Arm
6This “manual” flush is obviously dependent on assumptions on the (undoc-
umented) line replacement policy implemented by the hardware, making it
a brittle and potentially incomplete mechanism. Intel recently added sup-
port for flushing the L1-D cache [Intel 2018a]. However, we cannot use this
feature, as a microcode update is yet to be available for our machine, and
there is still no L1-I flush.
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systems have a much simpler, single-level interrupt control
mechanism, which avoids this race.
Another race is caused by timer interrupt handling being
delayed due to another interrupt occurring just before the
preemption timer. We handle this by adding a margin for
interrupt handling to the padding time.
In summary, the kernel executes the following steps when
handling a preemption tick; steps in bold are only performed
on a kernel switch.
(1) acquire the kernel lock
(2) process the timer tick normally
(3) mask interrupts of the previous kernel
(4) switch the kernel stack
(5) conduct the domain switch by switching the user
thread (and thus the kernel image)
(6) release the kernel lock
(7) unmask interrupts of this kernel
(8) flush on-core microarchitectural state
(9) pre-fetch shared kernel data
(10) poll the cycle counter for the configured latency
(11) reprogram the timer interrupt
(12) restore the user stack pointer and return.
4.4 Kernel destruction
Destroying a kernel in a multicore system creates a race
condition, as the kernel that is being destroyed may be active
on other cores. For safe destruction, we first suspend all
threads belonging to the target kernel. We support this with
a bitmap in each kernel that indicates the cores on which the
kernel is presently running, the bitmap is updated during
each kernel switch.
During Kernel_Image destruction, the kernel first inval-
idates the target kernel capability (turning the kernel into
a “zombie” object). It then triggers a system_stall event,
which sends IPIs to all cores where the zombie is presently
running; this is analogous to TLB shoot-down. The cores
then schedule the idle thread belonging to the default Ker-
nel_Image (created at boot time). Similarly, the kernel sends
a TLB_invalidate IPI to all the cores that the target kernel
had been running on. Lastly, the initial core completes the
destruction and cleanup of the zombie.
Destroying active Kernel_Memory also invalidates the
kernel, resulting in the same sequence of actions. Destroying
either object invalidates the kernel, allowing the remaining
object to be destroyed without complications.
The existence of an always runnable idle thread is a core
invariant of seL4; we must maintain this invariant in the
face of kernels being dynamically created and destroyed. To
always keep the initial kernel, we prevent the destruction of
its Kernel_Memory capability by not providing it to userland.
That way, even if userland destroys the last Kernel_Image,
we guarantee that there is still a kernel and an idle thread.
Such a system will have no user-level threads, and will do
nothing more than acknowledging timer ticks.
One could think of more sophisticated schemes that allow
reusing the initial kernel’s memory where the intention is to
have a system that is partitioned for its lifetime. For now we
accept a small amount of dead memory. On x86, where the
kernel image includes 64 KiB of buffers used to flush the L1
caches, this presently amounts to about 216 KiB of waste on
a single core or 300 KiB on a 4-core machine. Corresponding
Arm sizes are 120 KiB and 168KiB.
5 EVALUATION
We evaluate our approach in terms of its ability to close
timing channels, as well as its effect on system performance.
5.1 Methodology
For quantitative analysis of timing channels, we use mu-
tual information (MI), defined in Shannon information the-
ory [Shannon 1948], as a measure of the size of a channel.
We model the channel as a pipe into which the sender places
inputs, drawn from some input set I (the secret values), and
receives outputs from some set O (the publicly observable
time measurements). In the case of a cache attack, the in-
put could be the number of cache sets the sender accesses
and the output is the time it takes the receiver to access a
previously-cached buffer. MI indicates the average number
of bits of information that a computationally unbounded
receiver can learn from each input by observing the output.
We model the output time measurements as a probability
density function, meaning that we are calculating the MI be-
tween discrete inputs and continuous outputs. If we treated
the output time measurements as purely discrete then we
would be treating all values as unordered and equivalent,
e.g. a collection of unique particularly high values would
not be treated differently from a collection of unique uni-
formly distributed values, therefore we might miss a leak.
Furthermore, for a uniform input distribution, if continuous
MI is zero then it implies that other similar measures, such
as discrete capacity [Shannon 1948], are also zero. As it is an
average function, rather than a maximum, MI is also easier
to reliably estimate, making it an effective metric to see if a
leak exists or not.
We send a large number of inputs and collect the corre-
sponding outputs. From this we use kernel density estima-
tion [Silverman 1986] to estimate the probability density
function of outputs for each input. Then, we use the rectan-
gle method (see e.g. [Hughes-Hallet et al. 2005] p. 340) to
estimate the MI between a uniform distribution on inputs
and the observed outputs, which we write asM.
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Sampling introduces noise, which will result in an appar-
ent non-zero MI even when no channel exists. Sampled data
can never prove that a leak does not exist, so instead we ask
if the data collected contains any evidence of an information
leak. IfM is very small, e.g., less that 1 millibit, we can safely
say that any channel is closed or negligible. If the estimated
leakage is higher than this we use the following test [Chothia
and Guha 2011; Chothia et al. 2013] to distinguish noise in
the sampling process from a significant leak.
We simulate the measurement noise of a zero-leakage
channel by shuffling the outputs in our dataset to randomly
chosen inputs. This produces a dataset with the same range
of values, but the random assignment ensures that there is
no relation between the inputs and outputs (i.e., zero leak-
age). We calculate the MI from this new dataset and repeat
100 times, giving us 100 estimations from channels that are
guaranteed to have zero leakage. From this we calculate the
mean and standard deviation of these results, and then cal-
culate the exact 95% confidence interval for an estimate to
be compatible with zero leakage, which we write asM0 (we
note that the 95th highest result from the tests would only
approximate the 95% confidence interval, not give it exactly).
If the estimate of MI from the original dataset is outside the
95% confidence interval for zero leakage (i.e.,M > M0) we
say that the observations are inconsistent with the MI being
zero, and so there is a leak (the strict inequality is important
here, because for very uniform data with no leakageM may
equalM0). If the estimated MI is within, or equal to, the 95%
confidence interval we conclude that the dataset does not
contain evidence of an information leak.
5.2 Hardware platforms
We conduct our experiments on representatives of the x86
and Arm architectures; Table 1 gives the details. We evaluate
leakage in three scenarios: raw refers to the unmitigated
System Haswell (x86) Sabre (ARMv7)
Microarchitecture Haswell Cortex A9
Processor/SoC Core i7-4700 i.MX 6Q
Cores × threads 4 × 2 4 × 1
Clock 3.4 GHz 0.8 GHz
Cache line size 64 B 32 B
L1-D/L1-I cache 32 KiB, 8-way 32KiB, 4-way
L2 cache 256 KiB, 8-way 1MiB, 16-way
L3 cache 8MiB, 16-way N/A
I-TLB 64, 8-way 32, 1-way
D-TLB 64, 4-way 32, 1-way
L2-TLB 1024, 8-way 128, 2-way
RAM 16GiB 1GiB
Table 1: Hardware platforms.
channel while protected refers to our implementation of
time protection, using two coloured domains with cloned
kernels, each is allocated 50% of available colours unless
stated otherwise.
For intra-core channels we additionally evaluate full
flush, which performs a maximal architecture-supported
reset of microarchitectural state. (This scenario makes no
sense on inter-core channels due to the concurrent access.)
On Arm, this adds flushing the L2 cache to the flush opera-
tions used for time protection (as described in Section 4.3),
and we also disable the BP and prefetcher for prohibiting
any uncontrollable microarchitecture state. On x86 the full
flush scenario omits the “manual” L1 cache flush and instead
flushes the whole cache hierarchy (wbinvd), and disables the
data prefetcher by updating MSR 0x1A4 [Viswanathan 2014].
As a base line we measure the worst-case direct and indi-
rect costs of flushing the (uncolourable) L1-I/D caches vs. the
complete cache hierarchy. The direct cost is the combined
latency of the flush instructions when all D-cache lines are
dirty (or the cost of the “manual flush” on x86). We measure
the indirect cost as the one-off slowdown experienced by an
application whose working set equals the size of the L1-D or
LLC. Note that for the L1 caches, the indirect cost is some-
what academic: It would be highly unusual for a process to
find any hot data in the L1 after another partition has been
executing for a full time slice (i.e. many milliseconds).
Table 2 shows results. The surprisingly high L1-flush cost
on x86 is a result of our “manual” flush: less than 0.5 µs is
for the L1-D flush, the rest is for the L1-I, where each of the
chained jumps is mis-predicted. Actual flush instructions
should reduce the overall L1 flush cost to well below 1µs.
To put these figures into context, consider that cache
flushes would only be required on a timer tick, which is
typically in the order of 10–100ms. Flushing the L1 can be
expected to add well below 1% overhead, while flushing the
whole cache hierarchy will add substantial overheads.
5.3 Timing channel mitigation efficacy
To cover the attack scenarios listed in Section 3.1, we demon-
strate a covert timing channel with a shared kernel im-
age (Section 5.3.1), intra-core and inter-core timing channel
benchmarks that exploit conflicts on all levels of caches (Sec-
tion 5.3.2), and a timing channel based on domain switching
latency (Section 5.3.4).
x86 Arm
Cache dir ind total dir ind total
L1 (µs) 25.52 1.08 26.59 20 24.53 44.53
all (ms) 0.27 0.25 0.52 0.38 0.77 1.15
Table 2: Worst-case cost of cache flushes.
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Figure 2: Kernel timing channel on x86, with coloured
userland (top) and full time protection (bottom). For
the former, observed MI from a sample size of 255,790
is 0.79 bits, which we write asM = 0.79 b, n = 255, 790.
With full time protection we getM = 0.6mb,M0 =
0.1mb, n = 255, 040 (1mb = 10−3b).
5.3.1 Timing channel via a shared kernel image. We demon-
strate that partitioning only user space is insufficient for mit-
igating covert channels, even though on seL4 this automat-
ically partitions dynamic kernel data (Section 2.4). Among
others, this setup already defeats the attack of van Schaik
et al. [2018], as page tables are automatically coloured.
We implement an LLC covert channel between coloured
user-space processes. The sender sends information by trig-
gering system calls, while the receiver, sharing the same core
with a time slice of 1ms, monitors the cache misses on the
cache set that kernel uses for serving the system calls.
The receiver firstly builds a probe buffer with the prime&
probe technique [Liu et al. 2015; Osvik et al. 2006; Percival
2005]: it compares the cache misses on the probed cache
sets before and after executing the system call, then marks
a cache set as an attack set if the number of cache misses
increase after the system call is returned.
The sender encodes a random sequence of symbols from
the set I = 0, 1, 2, 3 by using three system calls: Signal for 0,
TCB_SetPriority for 1, Poll for 2, and idling for 3. Figure 2
(top) shows the resulting channel matrix, which represents
the conditional probability of observing an output symbol
given a particular input symbol, shown as a heat map. A
channel is indicated by output symbols (cache misses) being
correlated with input symbols (system calls), i.e. variations
of probability (colour) along horizontal lines. Signal and
TCB_SetPriority lead to 500–700 misses, while Poll and
idle result in 200–600 misses, a clear channel. Calculating
the MI gives an estimated information leak ofM=0.79 bit
per iteration (2ms), transmitting 395 b/s. While the chan-
nel could be made more efficient with more complicated
encoding schemes, this is not the main focus of our work.
With cloned kernels the channels disappear (bottom of
Figure 2). The remaining channel is measured asM = 0.6
millibits (mb), therefore closed or negligible. We implement a
similar channel on the Arm, observing a non-trivial MIM =
20 mb, which reduces toM = 0.0mb with time protection.
5.3.2 Intra-core timing channels. We investigate the a full
set of channels exploitable by processes time-sharing a core,
targeting the L1-I, L1-D and L2 caches, the TLB, the BTB,
and the branch history buffer (BHB). We use a prime&probe
attack, where the receiver measures the timing on probing a
defined number of cache sets or entries.
We use theMastik [Yarom 2017] implementation of the L1-
D cache channel, the output symbol is the time to perform
the attack on every cache set. The L2 channel is the same
with a probing set large enough to cover that cache. We
build the L1-I channel by having the sender probe with jump
instructions that map to corresponding cache sets [Acıiçmez
2007; Acıiçmez et al. 2010]. For the TLB channel, the sender
probes the TLB entries by reading a integer from a number of
consecutive pages. We use a chained branch instructions as
the probing buffer for the BTB channel, the sender probing
3584–3712 branch instructions on Haswell, 0–512 on Sabre.
Our BHB channel is the same as the residual state-based
covert channel [Evtyushkin et al. 2016], where the sender
sends information by either taking or skiping a conditional
jump instruction. The receiver measures the latency on a
similar conditional jump instruction, sensing any speculative
execution caused by the sender’s history.
Platform Cache Raw Full flush Protected
x86 L1-D 4,000 0.5 (0.5) 0.6 (0.6)
L1-I 300 0.7 (0.8) 0.8 (0.5)
TLB 2,300 0.5 (0.5) 16.8 (23.9)
BTB 1,500 0.8 (0.8) 0.4 (0.4)
BHB 1,000 0.5 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
L2 2,700 2.3 (2.6) 50.5 (3.7)
Arm L1-D 2,000 1 (1) 30.2 (39.7)
L1-I 2,500 1.3 (1.3) 4.9 (5.2)
TLB 600 0.5 (0.5) 1.9 (2.2)
BTB 7.5 4.1 (4.4) 62.2 (73.5)
BHB 1,000 0 (0.5) 0.2 (54.4)
L2 1,900 21 (22) 1.4 (1.4)
Table 3: MI (mb) of unmitigated (raw) intra-core tim-
ing channels, mitigated with full cache flush (full
flush) and time protection (protected). Value in paren-
theses isM0.
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Figure 3: Unmitigated concurrent LLC side-channel at-
tack on x86. The pattern in blue shows victim’s cache
footprint detected by the spy.
Table 3 summarises results for the three scenarios defined
in Section 5.2. The raw scenario shows a large channel in each
case. On the Sabre we find that all channels are effectively
mitigated by the full flush as well as the protected scenario.
On Haswell, the picture is the same except for the L1-I and
L2 channels. The L1-I channel does not seem quite closed
with time protection, although the residual capacity is negli-
gible, and likely results from our imperfect “manual” flush.
While the full flush closes the L2 channel, our implemen-
tation of time protection (which colours the L2) fails to do
this, leaving a sizeable channel of 50mb. We believe that the
remaining channel is due to the aggressive data prefetcher, as
the channel is decreased toM = 6.4mb (M0 = 4.1mb) with
the data prefetcher disabled. This is strong evidence for the
need of a better software-hardware contract for controlling
any hidden microarchitecture state [Ge et al. 2018a].
5.3.3 Side channel on the LLC. To test the side channel mit-
igation for LLC-based attacks, we reproduce the attack of
Liu et al. [2015] on GnuPG version 1.4.13. The attack tar-
gets the square-and-multiply implementation of modular
exponentiation used as part of the ElGamal decryption.
We use two processes, executing concurrently on sep-
arate cores on Haswell. The victim repeatedly decrypts a
file, whereas the spy uses the Mastik implementation of the
LLC prime&probe attack to capture the victim’s cache ac-
tivity, searching for patterns that correspond to the use of
the square function. The cache activity learned by the spy is
shown on Figure 3. On cache set number 119, we see a se-
quence of blue dots separated by intervals of varying lengths.
Each of these dots is an invocation of the square function
Platform Timing No pad Protected (M0)
x86 On-line 8.4 0.5 (0.5)
pad = 58.8 µs Off-line 8.3 0.6 (0.6)
Arm On-line 1,400 16.3 (24.6)
pad = 62.5 µs Off-line 1,400 210 (237.2)
Table 4: Channel resulting from cache-flush latency
(mb) without and with time protection.
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Figure 4: The unmitigated offline time observed by the
receiver vs. the sender’s cache footprint, resulting in a
variation of domain switching latency on Sabre.M =
1.4 b, n = 1828
and the secret key is encoded in the length of the intervals
between the dots, with long intervals encoding ones and
short intervals zeros. We find that time protection closes the
channel (in this case by colouring the LLC), the spy can no
longer detect any cache activity of the victim.
5.3.4 Cache-flush channel. To demonstrate the cache-flush
channel we create a receiver that measures two properties:
online time is the receiver’s uninterrupted execution time
(i.e. the observed length of its time slice) while offline time
as the time between receiver’s executions. The receiver re-
peatedly checks the cycle counter, waiting on a large jump
that indicates a preemption. The length of the jump is the
offline time, whereas the time between consecutive intervals
is the online time.
The sender varies the number of L2 cache sets it accesses
in each time slice, manipulating the cost of the kernel’s L1
cache flushes, and thus the receiver’s online or offline time.
Figure 4 shows that the sender effectively modulates the
offline time. Table 4 shows that the channel exists on both
architectures, but is effectively closed with time padding.
5.3.5 Interrupt channel. We evaluate interrupt partitioning
with a sender which sends “no” by doing nothing or “yes” by
programming a timer to fire every millisecond, the receiver
is as in Section 5.3.4. Without interrupt partitioning, if the
interrupt fires while the receiver is executing, in average
0.5ms into its time slice, the kernel will be invoked, resulting
in the receiver recording a short on-line time. As the kernel
has masked the IRQ, it will not fire again until the sender
Platform IRQs Shared Partitioned
x86 no 10 (0) 10 (0)
yes 5 (5) 10 (0)
Arm no 10 (0) 10 (0)
yes 5 (5) 10 (0)
Table 5: Interrupt channel vs. IRQ partitioning: re-
ceiver on-line time in ms (standard deviation).
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x86 Arm
Version Cycles O/H Cycles O/H
original 381 - 344 -
colour-ready 386 1% 391 14%
intra-colour 380 0% 395 15%
inter-colour 378 -1% 389 13%
Table 6: IPC performance microbenchmarks.
acknowledges it, and the receiver will not be interrupted a
second time, and thus record a long on-line time, in average
9.5ms for a 10mms time slice. This bi-modal distribution
is an effective channel and is reflected in the large, 5ms
standard deviation in Table 5.
With interrupt partitioning, the receiver is not preempted
during its time slice, resulting in a deterministic on-line time,
and thus a closed channel.
5.4 Performance
5.4.1 IPC microbenchmarks. We evaluate the impact of time
protection by measuring the cost of the most important
(and highly optimised) microkernel operation, cross-address-
space message-passing IPC. Table 6 summarises the results,
where Colour ready refers to a kernel supporting time pro-
tection without using it, intra-colour measures IPC that does
not cross domains (kernels), while inter-colour does. The
last is an artificial case that does not use a fixed time slice
or time padding (which would defer IPC delivery to the par-
tition switch) examining baseline cost of our mechanisms.
Standard deviations from 30 runs are less than 1%.
We find that the time-protection mechanisms add negligi-
ble overhead on x86. On Arm, in contrast, there is a signifi-
cant baseline cost to supporting the kernel clone mechanism,
resulting from the fact that with multiple kernels, we can
no longer use global mappings with large entries to map
the kernel’s virtual address space. The Sabre’s A9 core has a
2-way L2-TLB, resulting in increased conflict misses on the
cross-address-space IPC test. There is no further overhead
from using cloning.
Platf. Mode Idle L1-D L1-I L2 LLC
x86 Raw 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.5
Full flush 271 271 271 271 271
Protected 30 30 30 30 30
Arm Raw 0.7 0.8 1.2 N/A 1.6
Full flush 414 414 414 N/A 414
Protected 27 27 27 N/A 31
Table 7: Cost (µs) of switching away from a domain
running various receivers from Section 5.3.2.
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Figure 5: Splash-2 performance with cache colouring
for x86 (top) and Arm.
5.4.2 Domain switching cost. In Table 2 we measured the
worst-case cache-flush costs. We expect those to dominate
the cost added to domain switches by time protection. To ver-
ify we evaluate the domain-switch latency (without padding)
for a number of our attack workloads. Specifically we mea-
sure the time taken to switch from the receiver of a prime&
probe attack to an idle domain. We report the mean for 320
runs, all standard deviations are less than 1% (ARM) or 3%
(x86). An exception is the LLC test, where original seL4 times
have a bimodal distribution and we report median values
(standard deviation: 25% for Arm, 18% for x86 ).
Table 7 shows the results for our three defence scenarios.
We observe first that the workload dependence of the latency
evident in the raw system has mostly vanished from the
defended systems, even without padding. We second notice
that, as expected, the full flush latencies match the flush
costs of Table 2. With time protection, the switch latency
is slightly higher than the direct L1-flush cost of Table 2,
confirming our hypothesis that this is the dominant cost,
and also supporting the comment in Section 5.2 that indirect
flush cost are of little relevance for L1 caches.
Most importantly, the results show that our implementa-
tion of time protection imposes significantly less overhead
than the full flush, despite being as effective in removing
timing channels (except for the issues resulting from the lack
of targeted cache flushes discussed in Section 5.3.2).
5.4.3 The cost of cache colouring. To evaluate the cost of
cache colouring, we port the Splash-2 benchmark [Woo et al.
1995] to the seL4 system (except volrend due to its Linux de-
pendencies), with running parameters that consume 220MiB
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of heap and 1MiB of stack. Figure 5 shows the overhead of
cache colouring with and without the kernel clone mech-
anism. We report the mean of 10 repeated single-threaded
runs (standard deviations are below 3%). The benchmarking
thread is the only user thread in the system.
On Sabre, cache colouring introduces less than 1% slow-
down for most of the benchmarks. The only exception is ray-
trace, which shows a 6.5% slowdown when executing with
50% of the cache, as this benchmark has a large cache work-
ing set. However, given a 75% cache share, the slowdown
drops to 2.5%. On top of this, running on a cloned kernel
adds almost no performance penalty, except on waterspatial,
where it is still below 0.5%.
On Haswell, we observe slightly larger performance over-
heads, as we partition based on colours of the relatively small
(256 KiB) L2 cache (which implicitly colours the LLC). The
alternative would be to only colour the LLC and flush the L2,
but with no targeted L2 flush supported by the architecture
this seems not worthwhile. Still, the majority of the Splash-2
tests only slow down by less than 2%. Increasing cache share
to 75% limits the overhead to below 3.5%. As for Arm, the
kernel clone mechanism has close to zero overhead.
5.4.4 The impact of domain switches. For evaluating the full
impact of time protection, we select from Splash-2 the bench-
marks suffering the highest and lowest cache-partitioning
overheads according to Figure 5. We simulate a timing-
channel defence scenario, with the Splash benchmark shar-
ing a core with an attacking thread. The latter is continuously
probing the L1-I and the LLC caches. We use full time pro-
tection with a 10ms time slice. We give the Splash program
50% or 75% of the cache and use the padding times of Table 4.
Note these are well above the worst-case L1 flush costs of
Table 2 and could be optimised. We report in Table 8 averages
of 10 runs (standard deviations below 0.1%).
On Haswell (x86), cache partitioning actually improves
performance of the radiocity benchmark: it provides per-
formance isolation, removing the frequent conflict misses
resulting from the attack thread in the unprotected system.
This performance gain offsets the increased context-switch
latency from time padding; we see the same effect on ocean
x86 Arm
Version ocean radiosity lu raytrace
50% colour 4.8% -0.5% 0.03% -2.4%
50% + padding 5.5% 0.1% 0.3% -2.0%
75% colour -0.3% -0.5% -0.02% -6%
75% + padding 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% -5.8%
Table 8: Splash-2 performance overhead from time
protection with time padding disabled or enabled.
when it gets a 75% share of the cache. The overhead resulting
from padding is about 0.7%.
The performance isolation effect is even more pronounced
on the Arm: raytrace consistently performs better with a
partitioned cache, and the performance of lu is practically
unaffected by partitioning. Padding only introduces 0.2%–
0.4% performance overhead.
6 RELATEDWORK
Deterministic systems eliminate timing channels by provid-
ing only virtual time; Determinator [Aviram et al. 2010] is
an example aimed at clouds. Ford [2012] extends this model
with scheduled IO. Stopwatch [Li et al. 2013] visualizes time
by running three replicas of a system, then only announces
externally-visible timing events at the median of the times
determined by the replicas. The system is effective but at a
heavy performance penalty.
Page colouring for partitioning caches goes back to Ber-
shad et al. [1994]; Kessler and Hill [1992], who proposed it
for performance isolation. Liedtke et al. [1997] proposed the
same for improved real-time predictability, while Shi et al.
[2011] proposed dynamic page colouring for mitigating at-
tacks against cryptographic algorithms in the hypervisor.
StealthMem [Kim et al. 2012] uses colouring to provide
some safe storage with controlled cache residency. CATa-
lyst [Liu et al. 2016] uses Intel’s CAT technology for LLC
partitioning for a similar purpose.
Percival [2005] proposed hardware-supported partitioning
of the L1 cache, while Wang and Lee [2007] suggested hard-
ware mechanisms for locking cache lines, called a partition-
locked cache (PLcache). Ge et al. [2018a] investigate short-
comings in architectural support for preventing timing chan-
nels and propose an extended hardware-software contract.
Multikernels [Baumann et al. 2009] consist of multiple,
shared-nothing kernel images on the same hardware plat-
form, although on separate cores, for improved many-core
scalability. Barrellfish/DS [Zellweger et al. 2014] separates
OS kernel images from physical CPU cores, to support hot-
plugging and energy management.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We proposed, implemented and evaluated time protection, a
mandatory, black-box kernel mechanism for preventing mi-
croarchitectural timing channels. Time protection employs
a combination of cache partitioning through colouring and
flushing of non-partitionable hardware state. It leverages a
policy-free kernel clone mechanism to almost perfectly par-
tition the kernel itself, resulting in a per-partition kernel
image on each core, with interrupts being partitioned as
well. Our evaluation shows that the mechanisms are effec-
tive for closing all studied timing channels, while imposing
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small to negligible performance overhead. While present
x86 hardware has some shortcomings that prevent perfect
time protection, it would be easy for manufacturers to ad-
dress this by supporting more targeted flush operations for
microarchitectural state.
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